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This study investigated the impact of defusion on a nonclinical sample (n = 60) 
in the context of negative (e.g., “I am a bad person”) and positive (e.g., “I am 
whole”) self-statements. Participants were assigned to one of three experimental 
conditions (Pro-Defusion, Anti-Defusion, and Neutral) that manipulated instruc-
tions about the impact of a defusion strategy. Defusion was also manipulated 
through the visual presentation of the self-statements, with each presented in 
three formats (Normal, Defused, Abnormal). Participants rated each self-state-
ment for comfort, believability, and willingness. Although the instructions did 
not affect ratings, negative statements presented in the defused format de-
creased discomfort and increased willingness and believability relative to the 
nondefused statements. The findings suggest using defusion strategies in coping 
with negative psychological content.
In acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT: Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999), an acceptance-based therapeutic regime, clients are encouraged to make 
willing contact with aversive psychological content. In order to achieve this 
therapeutic aim, ACT interventions are often bolstered with techniques that 
facilitate what is commonly referred to as cognitive defusion (Bach & Hayes, 
2002; Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999). From an ACT perspective, clients are fre-
quently “fused” with painful or negatively evaluated psychological content, 
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and defusion strategies create a “de-fused” perspective that permits greater 
behavioral flexibility.
Defusion
Defusion is a difficult concept to define in simple language. In clinical 
terms, clients are described as being “fused” with their thoughts when they be-
lieve that their thoughts say something important about who they are. For ex-
ample, if they frequently had the thought “I am a horrible person,” they might 
easily begin to have additional and more convincing thoughts like “I really am 
a horrible person and nobody could ever love me.” ACT clinicians encourage 
clients to “defuse” from their negative content by viewing their thoughts as 
just thoughts, rather than considering them to have meaning. In this way, de-
fusion involves a change in perspective that permits clients to see themselves 
as more than simply the sum of their thoughts and personal evaluations. In 
order to achieve this change in perspective, ACT therapists also employ tech-
niques that focus on a process referred to as “self-as-context” (e.g., the Floating 
Leaf Exercise). This technique establishes a broader sense of self within which 
thoughts and internal events have less importance (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2001). In more technical terms, the process of defusion has also been 
defined as the disruption of existing verbal functions of language such that 
the “ongoing process of framing events relationally is evident in the moment” 
(Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999, p. 74). This process is thought to result in a break-
ing down of existing problematic verbal relations, or at least appears to permit 
the person to see the relations without having to act in accordance with them.
Some aspects of defusion and self-as-context resemble, or are derived from, 
practices within cognitive research such as those that establish a distanced 
self-perspective (e.g., Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005) and those that involve 
mindfulness (e.g., Teasdale, Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby et al, 2000). But 
Titchener’s (1916) rapid word-repetition technique (e.g., “milk, milk, milk”) is 
perhaps the most well-known method for facilitating defusion. Within ACT, for 
example, clients might be encouraged to repeat negative content words rapidly 
(e.g., by saying “stupid, stupid, stupid”). The therapeutic aim of such a strategy 
is that during the repetition exercise the semantic functions, or meaning of the 
word, will be significantly reduced. Indeed, clients report that toward the end 
of the exercise they experienced the word simply as a strange sound (Hayes, 
Strosahl, et al., 1999, p. 154). The therapist then uses this experience to high-
light that the client’s negative content is also purely verbal and not a reflection 
of reality.
Empirical Evidence for Defusion
Although cognitive defusion strategies are frequently used within an ACT-
based clinical context, the empirical evidence to support their efficacy is rela-
tively limited. For example, indirect evidence for the utility of defusion may 
be derived from chronic pain analog studies involving the Cold Presser Task 
(Hayes, Bisset, et al., 1999; Takahashi, Muto, Tada, & Sugiyama, 2002). These 
studies have indicated that acceptance-based interventions that rely heavily on 
defusion strategies increase participants’ pain tolerance. Some support for the 
utility of defusion can also be derived from ACT intervention research. For ex-
ample, Bach & Hayes (2002) reported positive clinical outcomes for psychosis 
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with a brief ACT intervention in which defusion was a central component. 
Specifically, clients were encouraged to notice thoughts rather than to believe 
them. They engaged in a common defusion exercise in which they were in-
structed to “take their minds for a walk.” Indeed, the researchers argued that 
the 50% reduction in rehospitalization rates for the ACT group could be attrib-
uted to a reduction in the believability (i.e., defusion) of their psychotic psycho-
logical content. However, since defusion in this case was only one aspect of a 
complete ACT package, the specific role of defusion is difficult to decipher.
More direct evidence for defusion was generated by the first empirical in-
vestigation of the technique when Titchener’s (1916) word-repetition exercise 
was recently used in the context of negatively evaluated self-referential content 
(Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004). Specifically, undergraduate students 
were asked to generate two self-relevant negative thoughts that they found 
particularly disturbing (e.g., “I am too fat”) and then to restate each thought in 
a single word (e.g., “fat”). Participants then rated the levels of discomfort and 
believability associated with each word. In Experiment 1, the researchers com-
pared the defusion strategy (i.e., word repetition) with a distraction technique 
(i.e., reading an unrelated article). In Experiment 2, defusion was compared 
with thought control (e.g., participants could use breathing, positive self-talk, 
or positive imagery). The results from both experiments indicated that the 
defusion rationale produced the largest reductions in the believability of the 
negative self-relevant words, as well as in the levels of discomfort the words 
produced.
The Current Study
The current study was designed to test an alternative defusion technique 
to the one Masuda et al. (2004) used. The purpose was to ascertain if the reduc-
tion in believability was unique to the exercise used in the previous study, or 
if the same findings would be obtained across defusion strategies more gener-
ally. Rather than using word repetition, we presented a diffusion technique to 
undergraduate participants that ACT clinicians often use and is functionally 
similar to those described by Hayes, Strosahl, et al. (1999). Specifically, the 
phrase “I am having the thought that” was used to create a sense of cognitive 
distance between a participant and negative self-referential statements. For ex-
ample, the effects of the statement “I am a bad person” (Normal presentation) 
were then compared with the effects produced by the same statement when 
prefixed with the defusion phrase (“I am having the thought that I am a bad 
person”: Defused presentation). Similar to word repetition, the purpose of the 
prefix was to highlight the subsequent statement as simply a thought and not 
a fact.
In the current study, participants’ reactions to negative and positive self-
statements were measured with and without the defusion prefix, and with 
three self-report Likert-type rating scales that assessed levels of discomfort, 
believability, and willingness associated with the target statements. The three 
self-report scales were chosen on the basis of their inclusion in previous ACT 
research (e.g., Hayes, Bisset, et al., 1999; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004; 
Masuda et al., 2004). However, because the defusion prefix changed the length 
of the statement and might also be seen as creating an unusual verbalization, 
the self-statements were also prefixed with a phrase that matched the defusion 
statement in length and was equally unusual (i.e., “I have a wooden chair and 
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. . .”: Abnormal presentation). This provided a comparison statement of similar 
length that was also unusual but did not have the same level of defusion as the 
cognitive distancing statements.
In the current study, we hypothesized that the defusion statements would 
likely impact directly upon the explicit ratings associated with the negative self-
statements presented in the three formats (Normal, Abnormal, and Defused). 
Specifically, we hypothesized that the negative statements in the defused pre-
sentation format would likely decrease believability to see or say the state-
ments, but would increase willingness, relative to the normal and abnormal 
statements. The believability prediction was consistent with ACT findings, in 
which the change of one’s perspective about one’s psychological content, by 
indicating that the person is greater than the sum of the content, reduces the 
believability of the content (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). In oth-
er words, if I know that the thought “I am a horrible person” is only a thought, 
then I will be aware that the thought can say nothing about who I am as a real 
person. As a result, the thought will be less believable. Put simply, the believ-
ability of thoughts results from their potential to be viewed as having more 
meaning than they need to have (i.e., by saying something about who you are 
as a person). When this potential is reduced in the context of particular psy-
chological content, that content, by definition, will be less believable. In the re-
search by Masuda et al. (2004), the defusion exercise reduced the believability 
of the targeted psychological content.
The willingness prediction was also consistent with ACT; it simply assert-
ed that if you are defused from psychological content such that it says noth-
ing about who you are, you do not need to be unwilling to have it. In other 
words, if the content has no power, then you need not be afraid of what it can 
do to you. Although willingness had not been targeted directly by Masuda et 
al. (2004), other sources of empirical evidence have indicated that acceptance-
based strategies increase willingness (Levitt et al., 2004). We therefore predict-
ed that the defusion presentation format here would increase the willingness 
of participants to see or read the self-statements.
In the current research, we initially made no clear predictions about the 
impact of defusion on psychological discomfort. From an ACT perspective, dis-
comfort is not targeted directly because one can still engage in valued action 
when levels of discomfort are high. Furthermore, because individuals generally 
have little or no control over their emotional states, ACT encourages clients 
not to focus upon these as a potential source of behavior change. According 
to this view then, discomfort may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. 
Specifically, one might argue that increasing acceptance of content might in-
crease discomfort because one is more willing to make experiential contact 
with it. Alternatively, one might predict that discomfort would decrease when 
one realizes that thoughts associated with emotion are only thoughts, and 
as such have limited control or impact on who you really are. Interestingly, 
Masuda et al. (2004) reported that their defusion technique resulted in de-
creased discomfort. Taken together then, we had no clear initial prediction 
about what would happen to the participants’ levels of discomfort as a result 
of the defusion technique.
Traditionally, within a therapeutic context, cognitive defusion exercises 
have been employed as coping strategies for negative thoughts and feel-
ings. Thus, we made no clear predictions about the impact of defusion on 
the positive self-statements. These statements were simply included here as 
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an experimental control to determine if the emotional impact of defusion de-
pended on psychologically engaging with negative thoughts and feelings, or 
if the defusion effect simply reflected the process of distancing oneself from 
one’s thoughts in general. Overall, the inclusion of the positive self-statements 
would allow a fuller understanding of the manner in which defusion works.
In order to control for demand compliance effects (Fernandez & Turk, 
1994; Kanter, Kohlenberg, & Loftus, 2004), participants in the current study 
were also divided according to the types of explicit instructions they received 
about the utility of the defusion technique employed here. Each instruction 
stated that previous research had shown that the defusion prefix (1) increased 
(Pro-Defusion Condition); (2) decreased (Anti-Defusion Condition); or (3) had 
no effect upon (Neutral Condition) the emotional impact of self-statements. We 
hypothesized that although the defusion-relevant instructions might impact 
differentially upon participants’ ratings of discomfort, believability, and will-
ingness, the defusion prefix would still outperform the Normal and Abnormal 
statements.
An important caveat to the current research involves emphasizing that the 
primary aim of the work was to simply study the impact of a common ACT-
based defusion technique, particularly on individuals’ emotional reactions to 
negative self-statements. The research, therefore, was not designed to deter-
mine what defusion is or exactly how it works. With such limited existing evi-
dence of the utility of defusion per se, an important starting point for research 
in this area seemed to be to simply identify defusion techniques, isolate them 
as much as possible, and determine whether or not they produce positive and 
predictable outcomes. Hence, the current work may be described as analog re-
search in which some aspect of clinical practice is isolated and presented to a 
nonclinical sample in a controlled experimental environment. As a result, we 
anticipated that the current findings would contribute more to our faith in de-
fusion rather than our understanding of it.
Method
Participants
A total of 60 participants (31 female, 29 male) with an age range of 18–
57 years volunteered for the study (mode = 21). All participants were under-
graduate students and were recruited through Faculty announcements in the 
Department of Psychology. None had prior exposure to similar experimental 
procedures.  Participants were divided into three groups, each composed of 20 
students that differed only in the nature of the defusion-relevant instructions 
they received (Pro-Defusion, Anti-Defusion, and Neutral).
Materials
The 10 negative statements used in the study were rated the most negative 
from a larger pool, rated from 0 (extremely negative) to 20 (extremely positive); 
none of the 32 independent raters was thereafter recruited as an experimental 
participant. The mean ratings for the 10 negative statements ranged from 1.45 
for “I am a failure” to 3.23 for “No one will ever love me.” Table 1 presents all 
10 negative self-statements and their mean ratings.
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Table 1
Mean Ratings of the 10 Negative Self-Statements 
Employed in the Current Study
I am a failure. 1.45
My life is pointless. 2.39
I am stupid. 2.54
I am a bad person. 2.66
I make a mess of everything. 2.69
I am broken. 2.71
I am ugly. 2.85
I am helpless. 3.07
Sometimes I wish I wasn’t me. 3.21
No-one will ever love me 3.23
The 10 positive statements used here were selected in a similar manner 
by the same 32 independent raters. The mean ratings for the 10 positive state-
ments ranged from 18.66 (“I love life”) to 16.37 (“I am whole”). Table 2 presents 
all 10 self-statements and their mean ratings.
Table 2
Mean ratings of the 10 Positive Self-Statements Employed in the Current Study
I love life. 18.65
I know that I am loved. 17.79
I am happy with who I am. 17.77
There is so much that I can do with my life. 17.48
There is so much for me to be happy about. 17.41
I am part of a beautiful world. 17.35
When things go wrong I know that I will always have friends. 16.92
I have no problems that can’t be solved. 16.73
I am proud of myself. 16.68
I am whole. 16.37
Measures
Each participant first completed three self-report questionnaires. These 
were composed of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-37, see Hayes 
et al., 2004); the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II, see Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996); and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI Form Y-2, see Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Luschene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The assignment of participants to 
experimental conditions was randomized and did not depend upon their scores 
on the questionnaires. The three measures were simply included as a means 
of determining any differences between the three experimental groups (Pro-
Defusion, Anti-Defusion, and Neutral) that might influence their performance 
during the experiment. For example, participants who score high in acceptance 
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(i.e., low in avoidance) on the AAQ might respond more readily to defusion than 
those who score low in acceptance (high in avoidance). Furthermore, low AAQ 
responders may be less willing to engage with the negative self-statements, 
and this might considerably undermine their full participation in the study.
Experiential Avoidance
The AAQ 37-item version is a self-report measure of an individual’s general 
level of emotional avoidance. Individuals are asked to rate the truth of each state-
ment as it applies to themselves, on a scale of 1 (never true) to 7 (always true). 
Low scores on the AAQ indicate high avoidance and low acceptance, whereas high 
scores indicate low avoidance and high acceptance. Although the AAQ 37-item 
is a relatively new measure, initial research on similar versions of the AAQ indi-
cate good psychometric properties, with good evidence of convergent, criterion-
 related, and construct validity (see Bond & Bunce, 2003; Hayes et al., 2004).
Depression
The BDI-II consists of 21 groups of four statements (all scored from 0 to 3). 
Individuals are asked to select one statement from each group that best de-
scribes how they have been feeling during the previous two weeks. The BDI-II 
is scored according to four categories: 0–13: Minimal Depression; 14–19: Mild; 
20–28: Moderate; and 29–63: Severe. The BDI-II is a widely used measure of 
depression and has good, well-established psychometric properties. The scales 
indicate good internal consistency (Cronbach coefficient alpha = 0.93 for col-
lege students) and correlate well with several clinical assessment ratings of 
depression (Beck et al., 1996).
Trait Anxiety
The STAI Form Y-2 is used to assess levels of trait anxiety in both clini-
cal and nonclinical populations. It is composed of 20 self-statements that ask 
individuals to rate how they feel in general, on a scale of 1 (almost never) to 
4 (almost always). The STAI Form Y is a valid measure of anxiety indicating 
good test-retest reliability for a sample of college students (0.73–0.86) and 
high internal consistency (Cronbach coefficient alpha is 0.90). The STAI Form 
Y is also reliable and correlates with other established anxiety measures (see 
Spielberger, et al., 1983).
Procedure
This study used a design of 3 × 3 × 2 mixed-between-within participants 
with instructions (about the impact of defusion as a coping strategy) as the 
between-participant variable (Pro-Defusion, Anti-Defusion, and Neutral), and 
the visual presentation format of the self-statements (Normal, Defused, and 
Abnormal), and statement-type (negative and positive) as within-participant 
variables. Participants completed each aspect of the experiment independent-
ly, while the experimenter remained seated outside the experimental room. All 
participants were seated on a standard plastic office swivel chair (rather than 
a wooden chair). Each individual took approximately 90 minutes to complete 
the study.
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Phase 1: Psychological Measures
Participants completed the AAQ, the BDI-II, and the STAI. The psychologi-
cal measures were presented in this order and in written format in a booklet.
Phase 2: Defusion-related Instructions
Prior to Phase 1, each participant was randomly assigned to one of three 
groups (Pro-Defusion, Anti-Defusion, and Neutral). The defusion-related in-
structions were presented in written format, in a booklet the experimenter 
provided. Each instruction booklet differed as to the specific instructions per-
taining to the emotional impact of defusion. Participants in the Pro-Defusion 
Group received instructions supporting a defusion rationale. That is, they were 
instructed that adding the prefix “I am having the thought that” to a negative 
self-statement decreases its emotional impact, thereby making the statement 
easier to cope with. In contrast, participants in the Anti-Defusion Group were 
given an instruction undermining a defusion strategy. The instruction stated 
that the prefix “I am having the thought that” increases the emotional impact 
of negative self-statements, thereby making them harder to cope with. The 
Neutral Group simply functioned as an experimental control. Participants in 
this group were instructed that the prefix would have no effect on one’s emo-
tional reaction to negative self-statements. Having read the defusion-related 
instructions, participants were required to indicate they had understood the 
instructions by selecting the correct answer from a multiple choice question.
Phase 3: Automated Presentation and Ratings of Self-Statements
In each of the three groups, participants were exposed to an identical auto-
mated procedure that was used to deliver a number of independent computer 
trials. Each computer trial presented 1 of the 10 negative self-statements or 
1 of the 10 positive statements on the screen. In addition, each negative and 
positive self-statement was presented in three different presentation formats 
(Normal, Abnormal, and Defused). Thus, each participant was presented with 
a total of 60 single trials (i.e., 10 negative statements presented in three for-
mats and 10 positive statements presented in three formats). In the Normal 
presentation format, each self-statement appeared without a prefix (e.g., “I am 
a bad person”). In the Defused presentation, each statement was prefixed with 
“I am having the thought that” (e.g., “I am having the thought that I am a bad 
person”). In Abnormal presentation, each statement was prefixed with “I have 
a wooden chair and” (e.g., “I have a wooden chair and I am a bad person”).
Each experimental trial commenced with the instruction to read the follow-
ing single self-statement carefully and to think about it. On each of the 60 in-
dependent trials, one of the negative or positive statements in one of the three 
formats appeared on the screen for 6 s. Immediately after the presentation of 
each self-statement, a new screen automatically appeared with three rating 
scales. Participants were asked to provide three ratings, as follows: (1) “Rate 
the extent to which you felt comfortable or uncomfortable reading and think-
ing about the previous statement” (Comfort); (2) “Rate the extent to which you 
found the previous statement believable” (Believability); and (3) “Rate the ex-
tent to which you were willing to read and think about the previous statement” 
(Willingness). All three rating scales ranged from 0 (extremely comfortable; 
extremely believable; and extremely willing) to 100 (extremely uncomfortable; 
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extremely unbelievable; and extremely unwilling). Participants rated their reac-
tions to the statements by using the computer’s mouse to drag a pointer along 
each of the three scales. The trial ended when the participant clicked on an 
end-of-trial button; this cleared the screen and after a 1 s. inter-trial interval, 
the next trial commenced immediately (i.e., the next self-statement appeared 
on the screen). Each of the 10 negative and 10 positive self-statements, in their 
three formats, was presented once in random order for each participant. After 
the last trial (60), a message appeared on screen asking the participant to re-
port to the experimenter.
Phase 4: Postexperimental Measures
After the 60 trials, participants completed two rating scales that asked 
(1) “To what extent did you read the statements and ratings and answer them 
honestly?” (honesty) and (2) “To what extent, do you think your ratings have 
been affected by the instructions you received at the beginning of the study?” 
(control of defusion-related instructions). Participants provided each rating on 
a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 7 (Entirely). Participants 
were then thanked and debriefed.
Results
Psychological Measures
Table 3 presents the mean (and standard deviation) ratings for each of the 
psychological measures (AAQ, BDI-II, and STAI) for each group of participants. 
In each case, the measures were broadly similar across groups. Indeed, three 
separate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for each measure revealed no 
significant differences (AAQ 37-item [p = 0.67]; BDI [p = 0.25]; STAI (Y2) [p = 
0.84]).
Table 3
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Psychological Measures for Each 
Instruction Group
AAQ-37 BDI-II STAI-Y2
Pro-Defusion 160.95 (17.37) 7.25 (4.87) 36.45 (8.42)
Anti-Defusion 158.25 (12.54) 6.10 (5.77) 37.25 (11.15)
Neutral 163.25 (21.81) 8.90 (5.26) 38.40 (11.31)
Adherence Measures
High ratings were obtained on the honesty measure across all three groups 
(Pro-Defusion: M = 6.20, SD = 0.61; Anti-Defusion: M = 5.95, SD = 0.99; and 
Neutral: M = 5.90, SD = 0.85). Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA revealed no sig-
nificant differences between groups, F(2, 57) = 0.74, p = 0.48. These findings 
indicated that participants on the whole had responded honestly to the self-
statements.
In contrast, the mean ratings on adherence to the defusion-related instruc-
tions appeared to be relatively low for each of the three groups (Pro-Defusion: 
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M = 3.40, SD = 1.90; Anti-Defusion: M = 2.95, SD = 1.98; and Neutral: M = 3.90, 
SD = 2.07). The results from a one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differ-
ence between groups in this regard, F(2, 57) = 1.14, p = 0.33. Although these 
findings suggested that the defusion-related instructions did not greatly influ-
ence the participants, perhaps a more important result was of no between-
group differences.
Self-Report Measures
For the purposes of analysis, the 30 negative and 30 positive self- statements 
were divided according to the three presentation formats: Normal, Abnormal, 
and Defused. The three ratings (comfort, believability, and willingness) for 
each of the three statement-types, summed across the 10 trials for each par-
ticipant, ranged from 0 to 1000. The data obtained for the negative and posi-
tive self-statements were analyzed separately and are presented in separate 
sections below.
Negative Self-Statements  
The mean overall scores were calculated for the negative self-statements 
for each of the three ratings, across participants, for each of the three instruc-
tion groups and divided by the three statement-types. In the interests of clarity, 
the three sets of means are referred to as negative comfort, negative willing-
ness, and negative believability. Table 4 presents the means and standard de-
viations for each of these ratings, calculated across participants, for each of 
the three instruction groups divided by the three statement-types. 
Table 4
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Discomfort, Willingness, and Believability 
Ratings of the Three Statement Types for the Three Conditions for Negative 
Self-Statements
Statement type Pro-Defusion group Anti-Defusion group Neutral group
Comfort ratings
Normal 326.80 (293.18) 465.65 (322.41) 390.95 (268.59)
Abnormal 284.70 (261.68) 421.50 (275.46) 412.75 (293.69)
Defused 219.90 (220.62) 393.70 (297.62) 323.05 (232.14)
Willingness ratings
Normal 347.85 (336.91) 453.40 (314.58) 481.80 (266.26)
Abnormal 346.95 (325.22) 433.65 (255.67) 505.75 (286.82)
Defused 245.30 (259.04) 369.65 (281.98) 400.25 (262.42)
Believability ratings
Normal 849.250 (99.66) 709.50 (264.92) 837.10 (132.21)
Abnormal 835.05 (145.51) 706.35 (259.01) 817.25 (149.89)
Defused 630.80 (199.70) 625.90 (270.13) 726.00 (127.79)
Note. Lower scores indicate greater comfort, greater willingness, and greater 
believability.
The descriptive statistics indicated that within each group, the Defused 
presentation format, relative to Normal and Abnormal, produced lower levels of 
discomfort, higher levels of willingness, but—contrary to our prediction—higher 
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levels of believability. Across-group comparisons indicated lowest levels of dis-
comfort for Pro-Defusion and highest for Anti-Defusion. For willingness, Pro-
Defusion produced greatest willingness and Neutral lowest. For believability, the 
Anti-Defusion group produced the highest levels; the differences between Pro-
Defusion and Neutral were unsystematic. The statistical analyses conducted for 
each of the three types of ratings are discussed separately below.
Comfort ratings. A 3 × 3 mixed repeated measures ANOVA was con-
ducted on the comfort ratings, with group (Pro-Defusion, Anti-Defusion, and 
Neutral) as the between-participant variable, and presentation format (Normal, 
Abnormal, and Defused) as the within-participant variable. A significant main 
effect was identified for presentation format, F(2, 57) = 19.05, p < 0.0001, η
p
2 = 
0.25, but not for group (p = 0.21); and the interaction was also nonsignificant 
(p = 0.17). Post hoc (Scheffe) tests revealed a significant difference when com-
paring Defusion with Normal (p < 0.0001) and with Abnormal (p = 0.0001) pres-
entation formats but not between Normal and Abnormal. In short, defusion 
significantly decreased discomfort relative to the other two presentation for-
mats, and this effect was not significantly modulated by the defusion- related 
instructions (see Table 4).
Willingness ratings. Another 3 × 3 ANOVA was conducted on the willing-
ness ratings. Similar to the comfort measure, a significant main effect for the 
presentation format was obtained, F (2, 57) = 20.91, p < 0.0001, η
p
2 = 0.26; but 
once again, no other significant effects were found for group (p = 0.23) or inter-
action (p = 0.74). Scheffe post hoc tests revealed the same pattern as for com-
fort (Defusion vs. Normal, p < 0.0001; Defusion vs. Abnormal, p < 0.0001; Normal 
vs. Abnormal, not significant). In effect, defusion significantly increased will-
ingness relative to the other two presentation formats, with no modulation by 
the defusion-related instructions (see Table 4).
Believability ratings. The results of a third 3 × 3 ANOVA on the believability 
data also revealed a significant main effect for presentation format, F (2, 57) = 
44.30, p < 0.0001, η
p
2 = 0.43, and no effect for group (p = 0.12). However, a sig-
nificant interaction was obtained between format and group, F(4, 114) = 4.18, 
p = 0.003, η
p
2 = 0.12. In order to examine this effect, three separate one-way re-
peated measures ANOVAs were conducted, one for each group. The ANOVA for 
the Pro-Defusion group was significant, F(2, 19) = 24.19, p < 0.0001, η
p
2 = 0.56, 
and Sheffe post hoc tests indicated that believability was greater for Defusion 
relative to both Normal and Abnormal presentation formats (p < 0.0001, p < 
0.0001, respectively), with no significant difference between the latter (p = 
0.92). The Anti-Defusion ANOVA was also significant, F(2, 19) = 6.33, p = 0.004, 
η
p
2 = 0.25; and post hoc tests revealed greater believability for Defusion rela-
tive to Normal and Abnormal (p = 0.0125, p = 0.0168, respectively), with no 
significant difference between the latter (p = 0.99). The final ANOVA for the 
Neutral group was also significant, F(2, 19) = 16.98, p < 0.0001, η
p
2 = 0.47, with 
the post hoc tests again revealing greater believability for Defusion relative to 
Normal and Abnormal (p < 0.0001, p = 0.0003, respectively), but no significant 
difference between the latter (p = 0.62). In summary, and contrary to predic-
tions, Defusion significantly increased believability relative to the Normal and 
Abnormal presentation formats for each of the three groups (see Table 4).
Positive Self-Statements
The mean overall scores were calculated for the positive self-statements for 
each of the three ratings, across participants, for each of the three instruction 
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groups and divided by the three statement-types. In the interests of clarity, the 
three sets of means are referred to as positive comfort, positive willingness, 
and positive believability. Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations 
for each of the ratings, calculated across participants, for each of the three in-
struction groups divided by the three statement-types.
Table 5
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Discomfort, Willingness, and Believability 
Ratings of the Three Statement Types for the Three Conditions for Positive Self-
Statements
Statement Type Pro-Defusion group Anti-Defusion group Neutral group
Comfort ratings
Normal 112.55 (101.09) 141.40 (126.61) 158.25 (153.05)
Abnormal 122.15 (117.04) 189.90 (155.74) 220.55 (173.78)
Defused 119.40 (137.72) 195.50 (147.08) 166.95 (142.43)
Willingness ratings
Normal 125.05 (118.75) 172.25 (144.99) 216.95 (175.51)
Abnormal 162.15 (178.62) 227.95 (184.08) 285.10 (198.43)
Defused 135.15 (157.85) 190.85 (154.00) 219.25 (158.75)
Believability ratings
Normal 196.80 (140.65) 196.30 (143.53) 227.75 (156.34)
Abnormal 249.35 (191.89) 301.75 (190.77) 278.60 (125.09)
Defused 218.95 (204.13) 246.50 (149.09) 258.40 (156.77)
Note. Lower scores indicate greater comfort, greater willingness, and greater 
believability.
The descriptive statistics indicated that within each group, the Defused 
presentation format produced medium levels of willingness and believability 
relative to the Normal and Abnormal formats, with the Normal format pro-
ducing the highest level for each measure. The Normal format also produced 
the highest level of comfort; however, the differences between Abnormal and 
Defused failed to reveal the same pattern as the other two measures (i.e., will-
ingness and believability). Across group comparisons indicated highest lev-
els of comfort for Pro-Defusion, whereas the differences between Neutral and 
Anti-Defusion groups were unsystematic. The Pro-Defusion group also pro-
duced the highest levels of willingness, with the Neutral group producing the 
lowest levels of willingness. For believability, across group differences were 
overall unsystematic, although there is some indication that the Pro-Defusion 
instruction overall produced the highest levels of believability. The differences 
between believability ratings for the remaining instruction groups appeared 
random.
Comfort ratings. A 3 × 3 mixed repeated measures ANOVA was conduct-
ed on the comfort ratings, with defusion-related instruction group as the 
between-participant variable and statement presentation format as the with-
in-participant variable. A significant main effect was identified for statement 
presentation format, F (2, 57) = 6.64, p = 0.002, η
p
2 = 0.10, but not for instruc-
tion group (p = 0.25). Furthermore, there was no significant interaction effect 
(p = 0.07). Post hoc (Scheffe) tests revealed a significant difference when com-
paring Normal and Abnormal statements (p = 0.002), with Normal statements 
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rated as more comfortable than Abnormal statements. However, no significant 
difference was obtained when comparing Defusion with Normal (p = 0.12) and 
with Abnormal (p = 0.31) presentation formats. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the Defused presentation format had little impact on the comfort 
ratings relative to the other two presentation formats. These findings were not 
significantly modulated by the defusion-related instructions (see Table 5).
Willingness ratings.  Another 3 × 3 mixed repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the willingness ratings. This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect for statement presentation format, F(2, 57) = 9.54, p = 0.0001, η
p
2 = 0.14. 
However, the main effect for defusion-related instruction group was nonsignif-
icant (p = 0.13), as was the interaction effect (p = 0.76). Post hoc (Scheffe) tests 
revealed a significant difference between Normal and Abnormal (p = 0.0004) 
and between Defusion and Abnormal (p = 0.005) presentation format, with 
participants being more willing to experience statements in the Normal and 
Defused presentation format and least willing to experience statements pre-
sented in the Abnormal format. The difference between Normal and Defusion 
statements was nonsignificant (p = 0.73). Thus, the Defused format and the 
Normal format appeared to impact on participants’ willingness to experience 
the positive self-statements in a similar manner. Once again, these findings 
were not modulated by the defusion-related instructions (see Table 5).
Believability ratings. A 3 × 3 mixed repeated measures ANOVA was also 
conducted on the positive believability ratings. Similar to both the positive 
comfort and positive willingness data, the analysis of the believability ratings 
revealed a significant main effect for statement presentation format, F (2, 57) = 
9.79, p = 0.0001, η
p
2 = 0.15, but the effects for instruction group and the inter-
action effects were both nonsignificant (p = 0.76, p = 0.62, respectively). Similar 
to the comfort ratings, post hoc (Scheffe) tests revealed a significant differ-
ence between Normal and Abnormal statements only (p = 0.0001), with Normal 
statements rated as more believable than Abnormal statements. No significant 
differences were obtained when comparing Defusion with Normal (p = 0.10) 
and with Abnormal (p = 0.09) presentation formats.
In short, the Defused presentation format had little impact on the believa-
bility ratings relative to the other two presentation formats, and these findings 
could not be attributed to the defusion-related instructions (see Table 5).
In summary, a different pattern of responding was observed for the nega-
tive relative to the positive self-statements. With respect to the negative self-
statements, the Defused presentation format produced significantly higher 
levels of comfort (i.e., reduced discomfort), willingness, and believability 
relative to the Normal and Abnormal presentation formats. In contrast, the 
Defused presentation format had relatively little impact on the emotional rat-
ings of the positive self-statements and overall did not significantly differ from 
the Normal or Abnormal presentation formats.
Discussion
The current study primarily investigated the impact of cognitive defusion 
on participants’ self-reported levels of discomfort, willingness, and believ-
ability in the context of negative self-statements that appeared randomly on 
a computer screen. For all participants, the impact of the negative statements 
presented in the Defused form (relative to Normal and Abnormal presenta-
tions) was consistent with experimental hypotheses in that they increased 
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participants’ willingness to read and think about them. Although we had not 
made firm predictions about the potential impact of the defused presenta-
tions on participant discomfort associated with the negative statements, 
the data indicated that discomfort decreased in that context but not when 
the same statements were presented as Normal or Abnormal. In contrast, 
we had made firm predictions that believability of the negative statements 
would also be reduced by defusion, but the findings were inconsistent with 
these predictions and indicated that believability of the statements actually 
increased as a result of defusion. The results for the discomfort ratings here 
are consistent with those reported by Masuda et al. (2004), but the believ-
ability data are not (Masuda et al. reported decreases in believability). The 
current research was the first empirical analysis of the impact of defusion on 
experiential willingness.
In attempting to explain the discrepancy between the current and previ-
ous findings on believability of the negative self-statements, it might be ar-
gued that the target process of defusion did not actually occur here. However, 
this seems unlikely, because increases in willingness are consistent with a 
defusion effect. In other words, defusion should increase willingness to ex-
perience negative thoughts and feelings: if the content is perceived to be 
meaningless (i.e., if you are fully defused), then there should be no reason to 
avoid it.
Consequently, the believability measure probably did not operate here in 
the way we had anticipated. In retrospect, the believability findings obtained 
in the current study seem highly likely. Consider first that participants were 
required to respond to the discomfort and willingness scales by responding 
to the whole defusion statement (e.g., how uncomfortable does the statement 
“I am having the thought that I am a bad person” make you feel?). It seems 
likely, therefore, that participants responded to the believability of the defu-
sion statements in the same way (e.g., how believable is it that you are having 
the thought that you are a bad person?). In effect, the increased believability 
ratings for the defused statements indicated that the participants believed 
they were indeed having that thought, rather than indicating that the thought 
was true. In this sense, therefore, the increased believability ratings could be 
seen as evidence for a defusion effect as specified by ACT, especially when 
taken in the context of decreased discomfort and increased willingness for 
the same set of statements. Although we can only speculate about whether 
participants here were responding to the self-statement per se or to the fully 
defused statement, the latter is a possibility and in any case raises an inter-
esting empirical issue for future research.
The differences in believability across the two studies may also be ac-
counted for by the fact that different defusion exercises may operate in dif-
ferent ways. Specifically, Masuda et al. (2004) employed a semantic satiation 
exercise (i.e., word repetition) as opposed to the more cognitive distancing 
exercise employed here.  Although both types of exercise altered believability 
in different ways, believability did change, and thus one can reasonably ar-
gue that changes in believability are an important mechanism for the impact 
of defusion. However, whether on any instance believability should increase 
or decrease perhaps depends on how believability is explicitly assessed. The 
current research, therefore, highlights the need for future research on how 
best to assess the truth or meaning of an individual’s psychological content.
The current study manipulated instructions on the putative effects of 
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defusion in order to compare the relative utility of defusion instructions 
against more active experiential defusion through the visual presentation 
of the statements. Across all three defusion-related instruction groups, the 
Defusion presentation format continued to produce positive effects (relative 
to the other two formats) in terms of comfort, believability, and willingness, 
whereas the instructions overall on defusion appeared to have little or no 
impact. The primary aim of this minor manipulation was to begin to com-
pare the impact of defusion-based instructions versus exercises, because in 
ACT, defusion is rarely instructed and more often is delivered via experiential 
work. Indeed, the findings recorded here provided some very preliminary evi-
dence that the least visual experiential contact with the defused statements 
generated greater defusion than instructions.
One issue that may be raised about the current manipulation of defu-
sion instructions is that all three types of instructions actually contained 
the defusion prefix (“I’m having the thought that”). And it might be argued 
that this contaminated the potential impact of the prefix when presented 
with the statements in the Defused presentation format. Although this pos-
sibility remains, the data indicated that the instructions were of little im-
pact, and so the observed defusion effects were not likely to depend upon 
them. Indeed, what is remarkable is that the observed defusion effects on 
the ratings occurred for participants who had been instructed that defu-
sion has either no impact, or that it is counter-productive in the context 
of negative self-statements. Furthermore, our experimental target here was 
to compare defusion instructions versus experiential contact. Nonetheless, 
one avenue for future research might involve an alternative instruction ma-
nipulation that targeted all three types of presentation format and would 
provide greater clarity on the potential interactions between instructions 
and presentation.
In effect, the results suggest the superiority of experientially engaging 
with the statements over simple Pro-Defusion instructions. Indeed, the data 
here do not indicate that the provision of Pro-Defusion instructions actu-
ally enhanced the effect of the Defused presentation format, relative to the 
other two types of instruction. Although clinical concerns over the relative 
utility of instructions versus experiential exercises are commonplace (e.g., 
Eifert & Forsyth, 2005, p. 124), the current research contributes to this debate 
with empirical support for experiential contact over instructions, at least in 
the context of defusion. However, it is important to note that the defusion 
instructions provided here were not presented as a full therapeutic inter-
vention; nor were they designed to be, and, as such, an entirely different 
preparation may be necessary to fully explore this issue.
The low adherence ratings for the defusion-related instructions are en-
tirely consistent with their lack of impact on the ratings. If participants in 
all three groups had not attended well to the information on defusion, they 
were probably not influenced by this subsequently. However, it was not the 
case that participants did not understand these instructions, because on the 
instruction booklet, they had been asked to tick a box to indicate that they 
had fully understood and all participants had done so. It also remains pos-
sible that participants interpreted the adherence question (presented at the 
end of the experiment) as a reference to their adherence to the main instruc-
tions on the presentations of the statements and the ratings. However, this 
seems unlikely because the strong changes in ratings suggested no lack of 
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adherence during this part of the experiment, whereas the limited impact of 
the defusion instructions does imply lack of adherence at that earlier point. 
Although instructions encouraging participants to attend fully to them are 
difficult to provide, while at the same time avoiding them doing any experien-
tial exercises, the current study, at the very least, highlights the importance 
of including adherence measures.
The current research suggests that defusion is less psychologically active 
when used in conjunction with the positive self-statements relative to the 
negative self-statements. Specifically, although statements presented in the 
Defused format were significantly different from the Normal and Abnormal 
forms for the negative self-statements, the same effect was not recorded for 
the positive statements. Indeed, positive statements presented in the Defused 
format did not significantly differ from the other presentation formats, sug-
gesting that the defusion effect did not occur here. The absence of any change 
in levels of believability about the Defused presentation format further sug-
gests the absence of a defusion effect with the positive self-statements if we 
assume that changes in levels of believability are a useful measure of defu-
sion-related change (e.g., Masuda et al., 2004). These differential outcomes 
are consistent with our original hypotheses, and indeed with ACT, in suggest-
ing the greater impact of defusion on psychological content that is perhaps 
more susceptible to emotional avoidance.
However, it could be argued that participants simply failed to experientially 
engage with the positive self-statements, but did so with the more challenging 
negative statements. This may be particularly so because all the defusion-
based instructions contained a negative, rather than a positive, self-statement. 
Put simply, the instructions manipulation may have oriented participants to-
ward the negative statements (similar to the previous possibility that the in-
structions also oriented participants toward the defusion prefix). Yet again 
this seems unlikely because of the significant differences between the positive 
Normal and Abnormal presentation formats and because of the general lack of 
impact of the instructions. Indeed, the inclusion of a positive statement within 
the instructions would not likely have generated different results.
In summary, the research presented here provides empirical evidence of 
the utility of cognitive defusion in reducing the negative emotional impact of 
psychologically painful content and encouraging willingness to experience it. 
These findings are consistent with the clinical assumptions of ACT (Hayes, 
Strosahl, et al., 1999), and they provide indirect evidence that the positive 
outcomes reported for ACT result from its strong emphasis on defusion 
(e.g., Gifford et al., 2004; Gutierrez, Luciano, & Fink, 2004; Twohig, Hayes, & 
Masuda, 2006). At the very least, the evidence here supports the view that de-
fusion functions by changing an individual’s levels of discomfort, believabil-
ity, and willingness associated with painful content, rather than by altering 
the content directly. The clinical implications of the work suggest that defu-
sion should be delivered through experiential exercises rather than solely by 
instructions, and that the success of defusion techniques may be measured 
by assessing concurrent changes in discomfort, believability, and willingness. 
Although the process of defusion itself remains obscure, the current research 
offers further insight into how it can be measured and how it appears to op-
erate and, as such, makes a useful contribution to further research on the 
topic and more insightful clinical practice.
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